Personal Perspective on the Problem of Moral Objectivity: The Conception of Ontological Moral Certainty (69046)

Session Information: Ethics
Session Chair: David Matas

Saturday, 1 April 2023 13:40
Session: Session 3
Room: Room 708
Presentation Type:Oral Presentation

All presentation times are UTC + 9 (Asia/Tokyo)

Paper focuses on a problem of moral objectivity which is dominating in contemporary academic discourse of moral philosophy and pressing in today’s post-pandemic world tormented by moral and political conflicts.
Such contemporary philosophers as Nagel, Dworkin, Korsgaard have been trying to develop a conception of moral objectivity that would stay adequate to the first-person perspective of an agent. This paper argues that it is only possible to do that while invoking personal ontology. Relying on Robert Spaemann’s ontology of a person and elaborating its structural elements, the paper develops an alternative to contemporary analytic understanding of moral objectivity. This alternative is a conception of ontological moral certainty found within the moral experience of a person. The paper shows how transcending such traditional distinctions as subjective vs objective and fact vs value, the conception of ontological moral certainty grasps and clarifies the experience of moral objectivity better than the dominating analytic understanding of moral objectivity.

Aiste Noreikaite, Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania

About the Presenter(s)
Ms Aiste Noreikaite is a University Postdoctoral Fellow/Researcher at Mykolas Romeris University in Vilnius, Lithuania.

See this presentation on the full scheduleSaturday Schedule

Conference Comments & Feedback

Place a comment using your LinkedIn profile


Share on activity feed

Powered by WP LinkPress

Share this Presentation

Posted by Clive Staples Lewis

Last updated: 2023-02-23 23:45:00