Paper focuses on a problem of moral objectivity which is dominating in contemporary academic discourse of moral philosophy and pressing in today’s post-pandemic world tormented by moral and political conflicts.
Such contemporary philosophers as Nagel, Dworkin, Korsgaard have been trying to develop a conception of moral objectivity that would stay adequate to the first-person perspective of an agent. This paper argues that it is only possible to do that while invoking personal ontology. Relying on Robert Spaemann’s ontology of a person and elaborating its structural elements, the paper develops an alternative to contemporary analytic understanding of moral objectivity. This alternative is a conception of ontological moral certainty found within the moral experience of a person. The paper shows how transcending such traditional distinctions as subjective vs objective and fact vs value, the conception of ontological moral certainty grasps and clarifies the experience of moral objectivity better than the dominating analytic understanding of moral objectivity.

Authors:
Aiste Noreikaite, Mykolas Romeris University, Lithuania

About the Presenter(s)
Ms Aiste Noreikaite is a University Postdoctoral Fellow/Researcher at Mykolas Romeris University in Vilnius, Lithuania.

See this presentation on the full schedule – Saturday Schedule

Bookmark